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Abstract 
 
We propose a secure data aggregation (SDA) framework for mobile sensor networks whose topology 
changes dynamically with time. The SDA framework  (designed to be resilient to both insider and 
outsider attacks) comprises of a pair-wise key establishment mechanism run along the edges of a data 
gathering tree and a distributed trust evaluation model that is tightly integrated with the data aggregation 
process itself. If an aggregator node already shares a secret key with its child node, the two nodes locally 
coordinate to refresh and establish a new pair-wise secret key; otherwise, the aggregator node requests the 
sink to send a seed-secret key message that is used as the basis to establish a new pair-wise secret key. 
The trust evaluation model uses the two-sided Grubbs’ test to identify outlier data in the periodic beacons 
collected from the child nodes/neighbor nodes. Once the estimated trust score for a neighbor node falls 
below a threshold, the sensor node "locally" classifies its neighbor node as a "Compromised or Faulty" 
(CF) node, and discards the data or aggregated data received from the CF node. This way, the erroneous 
data generated by the CF nodes could be filtered at various levels of the data gathering tree and are 
prevented from reaching the root node (sink node). Finally, we assess the effectiveness of our trust 
evaluation model through a comprehensive simulation study.  
 
Keywords: Trust Evaluation, Key Establishment, Mobile Sensor Networks, Data Aggregation, 
Simulations 
 
1    Introduction 
 
A wireless sensor network (WSN) comprises of hundreds to thousands of sensor nodes that collect data 
from the environment for a given task, and one or more sinks (a.k.a. Base Station, BS) responsible for 
administering and collecting data from the sensor nodes [1]. WSNs are often deployed to detect a 
parameter or event of common interest (like temperature, fire, intrusion, etc) and the sink needs only one 
representative data of the entire area being monitored. Hence, instead of requiring the sensor nodes to 
individually send their data (either directly or through multi-hop paths), it would be more efficient 
(resource-wise) to gather data from all of these sensor nodes and send only one aggregated version of the 
data (say the minimum, maximum, sum, etc) to the sink. In this context, several data aggregation 
protocols (e.g. [2][3][4]) have been proposed for WSNs to eliminate the redundancy in data transmission 
and thereby reduce the communication and energy overhead at the sensor nodes.  
Data aggregation in WSNs is typically conducted using a tree topology, as it is the most energy-
efficient in terms of the number of link transmissions; there is only one path from any node to the root 
leader node (no scope for duplicate packets). Each intermediate non-leaf node in a data gathering tree 
(DG-tree) acts as an aggregator, fusing the data collected from its immediate child nodes and forwarding 
the aggregated data to its own upstream parent node in the tree. This way, data is processed and fused at 
several hops on the way to the leader node, which eventually forwards the aggregated data to the sink. 
However, hop-by-hop aggregation of data along the tree is prone to false data injection attacks. Once 
under his control, an adversary can reprogram a sensor node with malicious code to disrupt the normal 
functioning of the network. For example, a compromised sensor node could inject one or more spurious 
data packets that could corrupt the aggregated data that is on its way further up a DA-tree. Though several 
works in the literature (e.g., [5][6]) have addressed the problem of secure data aggregation, their focus has 
been on static sensor networks wherein the nodes do not move.  
In this research, we focus on secure data aggregation in wireless mobile sensor networks (WMSNs) 
wherein the sensor nodes move randomly, independent of each other. With the proliferation of electronic 
devices like Smart Phones and Personal Digital Assistants that are embedded with sensors to measure the 
temperature, location, humidity and other vital parameters of interest, there has been considerable interest 
in the sensors community to study data aggregation in the presence of node mobility. Due to the 
dynamically changing topology, the communication protocols and their secure variants developed for 
static sensor networks are not directly applicable for WMSNs. Nevertheless, several network disruption 
attacks (like node capture and false packet injection), packet interception attacks and denial of service 
attacks (like energy-depletion) are very much possible in WMSNs. In this context, we propose to develop 
a secure data aggregation framework for WMSNs that comprises of a rigorous trust-evaluation model and 
pair-wise secret key establishment process for the mobile sensor nodes. Ours will be the first such 
comprehensive secure data aggregation framework for WMSNs. Existing work, if any exists [7], has dealt 
with the above two mechanisms only in an isolated fashion, and not together. 
The following are the objectives of the proposed secure data aggregation (SDA) framework for 
WMSNs: (1) Protect from outsider attacks through secure, energy-efficient in-network data aggregation 
that provides confidentiality, integrity and authentication; (2) Protect from insider attacks through an 
embedded trust-evaluation model that can be used to detect and mitigate network disruption and energy 
depletion attacks as well as identify malicious compromised nodes and faulty nodes; and (3) Maximize 
the number of pair-wise secret keys established between sensor nodes, facilitated through node mobility 
and communication as part of data aggregation. 
The two key characteristic features that are embedded within the proposed SDA framework are: (1) 
Pair-wise Key Distribution: SDA facilitates establishment of pair-wise secret keys between as many 
sensor nodes as possible; and to be robust from node capture and packet interception attacks, the pair-
wise secret keys need to be refreshed by the concerned nodes every time a new data aggregation tree 
(DA-tree) is setup. With node mobility [8], we foresee frequent reconfiguration of the DA-trees and hence 
scope for establishment and renewal of pair-wise secret keys between several node pairs. (2) Trust 
Evaluation of Sensor Nodes: With the trust-level of the sensor nodes evaluated as part of the data 
aggregation process itself, the SDA framework is robust to network disruption and denial of service 
attacks without any additional communication overhead other than those incurred for the secure data 
aggregation process designed to provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication. Note that in this 
report, the terms data aggregation and data gathering as well as the acronyms DA-tree and DG-tree are 
used interchangeably. They mean the same. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on pair-wise key 
establishment mechanisms for static and mobile sensor networks and outlines the unique characteristics of 
our proposed mechanism. Section 3 presents the design of our proposed DA-tree based pair-wise key 
establishment mechanism for mobile sensor networks. Section 4 presents the distributed trust evaluation 
model. Section 5 presents a detailed simulation study of the trust evaluation model with respect to 
stability and minimum-distance spanning tree based data gathering algorithms and various parameters of 
the model. Section 6 concludes the paper. Section 7 outlines tasks for future work. 
 
2   Related Work on Pair-wise Key Establishment and Our Contribution 
 
Most of the literature available for pair-wise key establishment in sensor networks correspond to static 
sensor networks, where all nodes are static (do not move). We describe below a generic pair-wise key 
establishment model for static sensor networks, followed by a discussion of selected strategies proposed 
to improve the generic model.  
 
 
2.1 Generic Pair-wise Key Establishment Model for Static Sensor Networks 
 
The schemes proposed for static sensor networks go through the following two-three phases: (i) a key pre-
distribution phase; (ii) direct key establishment phase (shared key discovery), followed by a path-based 
key establishment phase. In the key-distribution phase (prior to deployment), each node is assigned a 
fraction of the keys (called key ring) from a larger key pool with the premise that there is a reasonable 
chance that two neighbor nodes share at least one common key. After deployment, the neighbor nodes 
exchange their key rings to find common key and share them, if any is found. If two neighbor nodes could 
not agree on a common key as part of the direct key establishment phase, they establish a path through 
one or more intermediate nodes such that there is a shared key between two successive nodes on the path. 
A secret key is then established between the neighbor nodes through such a multi-hop path. The integrity 
of the nodes constituting the path is critical to the confidentiality of the shared key established between 
the two neighbor nodes, and may further impact the secret key established in the individual neighborhood 
of these nodes. Several improvements to the above basic pair-wise key establishment model for static 
sensor networks have been proposed in the literature and we discuss here some of the representative 
schemes: 
 
2.2 Eschenauer and Gligor Scheme 
 
If the key rings are exchanged (during the key-setup phase) using a simple local broadcast, a casual 
eavesdropper could identify the key sets of all the nodes in the network and could identify an optimal 
subset of nodes to compromise in order to discover a larger subset of the key pool. To counter such 
eavesdropper attacks, Eschenauer and Gligor (EG-scheme) [15] proposed a puzzles-based approach (e.g., 
the Merkle puzzle [16]) wherein a sensor node could issue a puzzle for each key in its key ring to the 
neighbor nodes. Any neighbor node that responds with the correct answer for a client puzzle is identified 
as correctly knowing the associated key. 
 
2.3 q-Composite Keys Scheme 
 
To improve network resilience to node capture attacks, Chan et al [17] proposed a q-composite keys 
scheme, as a modification to the basic EG-scheme, wherein q common keys, with q > 1, are needed to 
overlap between the key rings of two nodes to setup a secure direct link. The motivation behind this 
scheme is that as the number of keys (in the key rings) required for overlap increases, it becomes 
exponentially harder for an attacker with a given key set to break a link. However, the tradeoff is that the 
number of keys forming the key pool has to be reduced in order to preserve the probability that two nodes 
share sufficient keys to establish a secure link. This facilitates an attacker to gain a larger sample of the 
key pool by breaking fewer nodes. 
 
2.4  Multi-path Key Reinforcement 
 
If two nodes A and B use a common key k in their key rings as the secret key for their communication 
link, the security of the link could be jeopardized if one or more nodes (other than A or B) that have the 
secret key k in their key rings are captured. To minimize the consequences of such node capture attacks, 
Anderson et al [18] propose a multi-path key reinforcement scheme wherein node A discovers multiple 
node-disjoint paths to its neighbor node B and sends a random sequence of bits (of the same length as the 
original secret key k), one sequence per node-disjoint path. If v1, v2, …, vj are the random bit sequences 
sent along j node-disjoint paths from A to B, then the new secret key k’ computed and used by both A and 
B for communication across their link would be a simple XOR of the original secret k with all the random 
bit sequences v1, v2, …, vj. That is, k’= k ⊕ v1 ⊕  v2 ⊕ ... ⊕  vj. Unless otherwise, an attacker eavesdrops on 
all the j node-disjoint paths, it would be difficult to extract k’ from k. However, the longer a node-disjoint 
path, the more vulnerable the path to reveal a random bit sequence (if the attacker manages to capture at 
least one intermediate node on a path, he can get access to the random bit sequence sent along that path). 
Hence, Chan et al [17] suggest the use of a 2-hop multi-path scheme for deriving a new secret key from a 
shared secret key in the key rings. The route discovery overhead associated with setting up multi-hop 
node-disjoint paths would also be minimal in the case of a 2-hop multi-path scheme: the two end nodes 
can exchange their neighbor lists (in the underlying communication network topology) and choose to 
route the random bit sequences through those neighbor nodes with which they share a secret key in their 
key rings. 
 
2.5  Issues with Pair-wise Key Establishment in Mobile Sensor Networks 
 
There are not many schemes proposed for key distribution in mobile sensor networks. The topology of the 
mobile sensor networks changes dynamically with time. Due to node mobility, there are good chances 
that any two nodes could be neighbors at some point of time. As a result, we may have to run path-based 
key establishment at any time (and not just after the initial node deployment). For the path-based key 
establishment phase to be successful, we need connectivity of the underlying network of direct links. It is 
very difficult to select a proper size for the key rings and the global key pool so that there can be at least 
one common key between an appreciable number of neighbor nodes to establish the direct links between 
nodes (as part of the direct key establishment phase) leading to connectivity of the underlying network. In 
the literature on mobile sensor networks, we came across a location-based strategy [19] that requires 
sensor nodes to be aware of their location (post-deployment) and use it as part of the pair-wise key 
establishment process. However, it is too energy-draining for a sensor node to use GPS-kind of 
mechanisms to regularly find about its location.  
 
2.6  Unique Characteristics of our Proposed Pair-wise Key Establishment Scheme  
 
There is no need to generate a key ring for every sensor node. Instead, we primarily assume every sensor 
node to share a secret key with the sink (see section 3.1 for a detailed list of assumptions). Our proposed 
scheme does not require a sensor node to establish direct link or path-based keys with each of its neighbor 
nodes. Instead, we first setup a data aggregation tree (DA-tree) of the underlying sensor network and 
require an aggregator node (intermediate node) of the tree to take up the responsibility of establishing 
pair-wise secret keys with its child nodes, if none exists so far, in co-ordination with the BS (sink). If an 
aggregator node already shares a secret key with a child node, it establishes a new secret key using the 
current shared secret key as the basis. By using the DA-tree as the underlying communication topology 
for pair-wise key establishment, we avoid the communication overhead as part of path-based key 
establishment in the neighborhood of every sensor node (associated with the pair-wise key schemes for 
static sensor networks). The communication between the aggregator node and the sink is facilitated 
through the paths that are part of the DA-tree itself and there is no need to establish separate paths 
between the sink and each of the aggregator nodes for pair-wise key establishment with their child nodes. 
Moreover, unlike the earlier mechanism proposed in the literature (discussed in Section 2.5), our 
proposed pair-wise key establishment mechanism does not require the sensor nodes to be location-aware.  
 
3    Pair-wise Key Establishment along a Data Aggregation Tree 
 
3.1  Key Assumptions 
 
The key assumptions are: (1) The sink BS is secure and it shares a 128-bit secret key with each sensor 
node. (2) The BS broadcasts any information to one or more sensor nodes in a secure fashion through the 
well-known µTESLA [9] protocol that also provides authentication. (3) Each node stores a Key Cache in 
its memory. The Key Cache of a node consists of the 128-bit pair-wise secret keys the node shares with 
one or more of the other nodes in the network and the sink. (4) The DA-tree is securely formed each time 
when needed. There is no scope for attack or impersonation during its construction. 
 3.2  Sequence of Steps in Pair-wise Key Establishment 
 
1. Construction of the DA-Tree: The sink initiates the construction of the DA-tree by sending a trigger 
signal to the leader node (the node with the largest available energy) to broadcast a Tree-Construction 
message to its neighborhood. When a sensor node receives the Tree-Construction message for the first 
time, it sets the sender of the message as its predecessor upstream node in the tree and broadcasts the 
message further to its neighbors, and discards any further Tree-Construction messages received. This 
way, the Tree-Construction message is broadcast by every sensor node (but exactly once) so that it can 
propagate throughout the network to eventually establish a spanning topology tree rooted at the leader 
node. The child nodes send a Parent-Update message to inform their parent node that they have chosen 
the latter as their immediate upstream node in the DA-tree.  
 
2. Maintenance of the DA-Tree: Each intermediate node of the DA-tree monitors the links to its 
downstream nodes (expecting periodic beacons from the neighbor nodes). When a downstream link 
breaks, the upstream node sends a secure Tree-Error message (encrypted and decrypted every hop on the 
path with the pair-wise secret keys that would have been established by then for the DA-tree using steps 3 
through 5) to the leader node, which forwards the message further to the sink. The sink initiates another 
tree construction process (Step 1).  
 
3. DA-Notification Message from the Aggregator Node to the Sink: If the aggregator node of the DA-
tree does not share a secret key with one or more of the child nodes, then the aggregator node sends a DA-
Notification message (encrypted with the shared secret key) to the BS, containing the IDs of the child 
nodes with which it does not yet share a secret key. The DA-Notification message also contains a Nonce 
(randomly generated by the aggregator node) that needs to be incremented and included in the Seed-
Secret-Key message sent as a response by the sink BS. 
 
4. Seed-Secret-Key Message from the Sink to the Aggregator Node: The sink BS responds to the DA-
Notification message with a Seed-Secret-Key message that contains different components: one for the 
aggregator node and one for every requested child node (with which the aggregator node needs to 
establish a new pair-wise secret key). The Seed-Secret-Key message component meant for the aggregator 
node – contains 64-bit random numbers generated by the BS (one for each of the aggregator node and its 
requested child nodes) as well as the incremented value of the Nonce sent in the DA-Notification 
message. The Seed-Secret-Key message components meant for the individual child nodes include the 64-
bit random number generated for the aggregator node as well as the aggregator node ID and a 64-bit 
random number generated for the individual child node. The Seed-Secret-Key message component meant 
for a node is encrypted using the secret key shared by the sink BS with the individual node. 
 
5. Agreement on a New Pair-wise Secret Key: Upon the receipt of the Seed-Secret-Key message from the 
sink BS, an aggregator node forwards to the appropriate child nodes – their respective encrypted message 
components as it is. A child node decrements the Seed-Secret-Key component message (addressed for it) 
using the secret key shared with the BS and ensures that the message component includes the ID of the 
aggregator node that forwarded the Seed-Secret-Key message. The child node then generates a 128-bit 
pair-wise secret key (generated on the fly by the child node) as well as a Nonce value (meant for the 
aggregator node to later send an incremented Nonce value in its response and get authenticated for 
receiving the new pair-wise secret key) and encrypts them using a temporary key, which is basically a 
product of the random numbers (generated by the sink BS and included in the Seed-Secret-Key message 
component) for the individual child node and the aggregator node. The child node sends this encrypted 
pair-wise secret key to the aggregator node as part of a New Pair-wise Key Establishment message. Upon 
receiving this message from a child node, the aggregator node computes on its own the temporary key 
(product of the random number sent to it by the sink BS and the random number meant for the appropriate 
child node) and decrements the message to extract the new pair-wise secret key and the Nonce value. The 
aggregator node responds with the New Pair-wise Key Acknowledgment message (encrypted with the 
new pair-wise secret key) containing the incremented Nonce value. After validating the incremented 
Nonce value in the acknowledgment message, the child node is convinced of the establishment of the 
pair-wise secret key with the aggregator node. 
 
6. Refreshment of a Pair-wise Secret Key: If an aggregator node already shares a pair-wise secret key 
with a child node established earlier due to their association in some data gathering tree (DG-tree) of the 
past, the aggregator node refreshes this association by establishing a new pair-wise secret key using the 
currently shared pair-wise secret key as the basis. In this pursuit, the aggregator node sends the child node 
a Pair-wise Key Refresh Request message that contains a randomly generated Nonce encrypted using the 
currently shared pair-wise secret key with the child node. The child node decrypts the message using the 
shared pair-wise secret key, and sends the following as part of a Pair-wise Key Refresh Response 
message: the incremented value of the Nonce received from the aggregator node, a new 128-bit pair-wise 
secret key (generated on the fly by the child node) as well as a new Nonce value (to be used to validate 
the aggregator node’s receipt of the new pair-wise secret key) – all of these encrypted with the most 
recently shared pair-wise secret key. The aggregator node decrypts the Pair-wise Key Refresh Response 
message to extract the new pair-wise secret key and confirms the receipt of the same by sending back (to 
the child node) an incremented value of the Nonce (generated and included by the child node in the 
Refresh Response message) encrypted with the new pair-wise secret key sent as part of a Pair-wise Key 
Refresh Acknowledgment message. 
 
3.3  Example for Pair-wise Key Establishment 
 
We now illustrate below the contents of the DA-notification message, seed-secret-key message and the 
sequence of messages that will be exchanged to establish or refresh the pair-wise secret key between an 
aggregator node and its child nodes. Note that the DA-notification message contains only the IDs of those 
child nodes with which the aggregator node does not already share a pair-wise secret key. For the sake of 
illustration, we refer to the aggregator node as A and its child nodes as B, C and D. We also assume that 
node A already shares a pair-wise secret key with node B and the key is to be refreshed (Figure 2). Node 
A requests the BS for a seed-secret-key only to establish pair-wise secret keys with C and D (Figure 1 
shows the message exchange between A and D to establish a pair-wise secret key). 
 
           
 Figure 1:  Message Exchange: Aggregator – Child    Figure 2: Message Exchange: Aggregator - Child      
 Nodes to Establish a New Pair-wise Secret Key           Nodes to Refresh/Renew a Pair-wise Secret Key 
 
DA-Notification Message:      
E[ ABSSecretK , ; {IDA || Nonce (NA) || Children(IDC, IDD) } ] 
 
Seed-Secret-Key Message:     
E[ ABSSecretK , ; {BS || Nonce (NA + 1) || RN(A) || RN(C) || RN(D)}] || E[ CBSSecretK , ; {BS || IDA || RN(A) || RN(C)} ] 
|| E[ DBSSecretK , ; {BS || IDA || RN(A) || RN(D)} ] 
 
4    Distributed Trust Evaluation Model 
 
We consider spanning tree-based data aggregation for mobile sensor networks. The data gathering tree 
(DG-tree) is formed using a spanning tree of the network that also includes the sink node as one of the 
constituent nodes. We run the Breadth First Search algorithm [10] on the spanning tree, starting from the 
sink node as the root node (leader node). As the edges of the spanning tree are traversed from the root 
node, the directions get assigned to the edges: leading to the nodes being classified as intermediate nodes 
and leaf nodes.  
Data aggregation starts from the leaf nodes. The nodes in the DG-tree are classified according to their 
position in the tree. The height of the DG-tree is the distance from the sink node to the leaf node that is 
located at the farthest distance (measured in terms of the number of edges). The root node is considered to 
be at level 0 and the immediate downstream child nodes of the root node are said to be at level 1, and so 
on. A leaf node forwards its individual beacon data (also considered to be the aggregated data) to its 
immediate upstream parent node. For an intermediate node to aggregate data, it should have received the 
aggregated data from all of its immediate downstream child nodes. The aggregated data (in the case of a 
child node that is a leaf node, the aggregated data is the beacon data) at an intermediate node is the sum of 
the aggregated data received from its immediate downstream child nodes and its own beacon data; this 
aggregated data is forwarded by the intermediate node to its own upstream parent node in the DG-tree.  
As the sensor nodes could become compromised (insider attacks) or faulty and generate erroneous 
data, it is imperative to weed out such corrupt data and facilitate the data aggregation process to bypass 
the compromised or faulty nodes (referred to as CF nodes). We propose a trust evaluation model that is 
based on assigning raw trust scores to sensor nodes based on the validity of the data generated by the 
nodes themselves (test for outliers). We assume a CF node to randomly generate data from a broader 
range and that is likely to be different from the range for normal data that is expected of the node. A trust 
score is assigned for a node based on the outliers detected in its data sequence and the trust score is 
dynamically updated for every round of data aggregation. A node whose sequence of data has more 
outliers, compared to the regular data, is likely to be untrustworthy, and is flagged a CF node after its trust 
score falls below a threshold. As part of our research, we have also analyzed the impact of different 
operating parameters of the Secure Data Aggregation (SDA) framework on the effectiveness of the trust 
evaluation model, measured with respect to the number of rounds (median value) incurred to detect the 
presence of CF nodes as well as the average value of the aggregated data at the sink (wherein data 
aggregation occurs in the presence of the CF nodes).  
An intermediate node considers the aggregated data received from a downstream child node in its data 
aggregation calculations only if the downstream child node has not been classified as a CF node. 
Aggregated data received from a downstream child node that is classified as a CF node is not considered 
for aggregation. To speed up the execution of the whole SDA framework, once a node is classified as a 
CF node, even the periodic beacon data received from that node is dropped and the trust value for the CF 
child/neighbor node is not calculated. 
To keep track of the number of individual nodes that have contributed to the aggregated data received 
from a downstream child node, we include a numSDAUsedNodes field in the header of the aggregated 
data packet. The value of the numSDAUsedNodes field in the header of the aggregated data packet is the 
sum of the values of the numSDAUsedNodes fields in the aggregated data packets received from the 
immediate downstream child nodes plus 1 (the '1' corresponds to the intermediate parent node that is 
aggregating the downstream child node data with its own beacon data). The numSDAUsedNodes field 
value for a leaf node is 1.  
 
 4.1  Example for Data Aggregation in the Presence of CF Nodes 
 
We exemplify the data aggregation process and the treatment meted out to aggregated data received from 
the CF nodes in Figure 3. There are a total of 12 nodes in the network, including the root node of the DG-
tree, which is the sink node (shown in green color). The regular nodes (non-CF nodes) are shown in light 
blue color and the CF nodes are shown in orange color respectively. The numbers outside the 
nodes/circles indicate the raw sensed data at the individual sensor nodes and the numSDAUsedNodes 
values in the header of the aggregated data packet at the level corresponding to the node. All leaf nodes 
have a numSDAUsedNodes value of 1. Beacon data or aggregated data from nodes classified as CF nodes 
are ignored. This could be observed in the calculations done at the intermediate node to the left of the 
DG-tree in Figure 1. The beacon data (of value 45) collected from a child CF node is ignored while 
calculating the aggregated data value (82 + 75 + 90 + 87 = 334) at the intermediate node, including the 
latter's own beacon data (of value 87). The numSDAUsedNodes value is 3 + 1 = 4 (where '3' corresponds 
to the sum of the numSDAUsedNodes values at the child nodes, which are all leaf nodes; and '1' 
corresponds to the intermediate node itself). 
The right part of the DG-tree has no CF nodes; so, the data aggregated at the right child node of the 
sink node is 93 + 73 + 95 = 261 and the numSDAUsedNodes value is 2 + 1 = 3. Note that the sink node 
rejects the aggregated data value received from the middle child node (second child node, which had 
generated a data value of 140) that had been already classified as a CF node. The sink node aggregates 
data from the left and right child nodes (ignoring the aggregated data received from the middle child 
node) and uses the corresponding numSDAUsedNodes to determine the overall average value for the data 
sensed from the network field. In the above example, the aggregated data value at the sink node is 334 + 
261 = 595 and the total value for numSDAUsedNodes is 4 + 3 = 7, leading to the overall average value for 
the data sensed from the network field to be computed as 595/7 = 85.0.   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Example to Illustrate Data Aggregation in the Presence of CF Nodes 
 
4.2  Computation of the Raw Trust Score 
 
An intermediate parent node conducts the trust calculations on each of its immediate downstream child 
nodes for every beacon data received and updates an estimated average trust score (Est. avg. trust score) 
based on the raw trust score evaluated on the result of the TrustComputation procedure run on the newly 
(latest) added beacon data (referred to as insertedData) to the BeaconWindow. The raw trust score for the 
insertedData is computed using the Grubbs' two-sided test [11]. 
The outlier test for the insertedData is conducted as follows: We determine the minimum and 
maximum data (MinData and MaxData) in the BeaconWindow as well as the Mean and standard 
deviation (SD) of the values. We then determine the appropriate t-score for the sample size corresponding 
to the size of the BeaconWindow. Table 1 lists the t-score reference values [11] used in our outlier 
detection calculations; the confidence interval is 95%. For sample size (size of the Beacon Window) that 
is < 5000 and not in Table 1, the appropriate t-score value is obtained through linear interpolation. 
 
Table 1: t-Score Table used for Two-Sided Grubbs' Test [11]: 95% Confidence Interval 
 
# samples 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
t-score 12.706 4.303 3.182 2.776 2.571 2.447 2.365 2.306 
         # samples 9 10 15 20 25 30 40 60 
t-score 2.262 2.228 2.131 2.086 2.060 2.042 2.021 2.000 
         # samples 120 ≥ 5000       
t-score 1.980 1.960       
 
The threshold value (Gthresh) for the Grubbs' test is calculated as follows:  
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The insertedData is an outlier if it is equal to either the MinData or the MaxData and satisfies one of 
the following two inequalities, as appropriate. 
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If the insertedData is classified as an outlier, the TrustComputation procedure returns 0; otherwise, 
returns 1. An intermediate parent node keeps track of the trust scores (stored in a TrustScoreBuffer) 
computed on an intermediate downstream child node in the recent past and during the current association. 
The size of the TrustScoreBuffer is limited by the MaxTrustScoreBufferSize variable, an input parameter 
in our simulations.  
 
4.3  Computation of the Estimated Average Trust Score 
 
The calculations to update the Est. Avg. Trust Score are conducted every time a raw trust score is returned 
from the TrustComputation procedure and the number of raw trust scores accumulated in the 
TrustScoreBuffer is at least half the MaxTrustScoreBufferSize. The Est. Avg. Trust Score (maintained at 
an intermediate parent node for an immediate downstream child node) is the weighted average trust score 
of two averages of the raw trust scores (0s and 1s) collected in the TrustScoreBuffer: one average is 
computed on all the raw trust score data accumulated due to previous association(s) between the two 
nodes on DG-tree(s) that had existed before the current DG-tree; the second average is computed on all 
the raw trust score data accumulated due to the association between the two nodes on the current DG-tree. 
The weighted average is computed using a parameter historyWeight, whose values range from 0 to 1. The 
formulation is as shown below: 
 
Est. Avg. Trust Score  
 = historyWeight *Average (data from TrustScoreBuffer based on prev. associations) +  
    (1 - historyWeight) * Average (data from TrustScoreBuffer based on curr. association) 
 
If the Est. Avg. Trust Score is below the TrustThreshold, then the sensor node is classified as a CF 
node. We record the round number it took to identify a node as CF node and keep track of the difference 
in the number of rounds since the node was set to be a CF node. A CF node is used primarily to 
determine/establish a data gathering tree, and not for data aggregation. The aggregated data/beacon data 
received from a CF node are not processed by its parent/immediate upstream node in the DG-tree. 
 
5    Simulations 
 
Simulations are conducted in a discrete-event simulator developed by us in Java. The same simulator has 
been earlier used by us for research [12] in mobile sensor networks. We conduct simulations on a network 
topology of dimensions 100m x 100m. There are a total of 100 nodes in the network, each operating at a 
fixed transmission range. The sink is located at one end of the network (at [100, 100]) and is also the root 
of the data gathering tree (DG-tree). The DG-tree used for data aggregation is based on the MST 
minimum distance-based spanning tree (MST) or the LET link expiration time-based spanning tree 
(LET). We use the distributed algorithms proposed in our earlier work [12] to determine the MST and 
LET-based DG-trees for mobile sensor networks.  
Node mobility is according to the Random Waypoint model [13] according to which nodes move 
randomly, independent of each other: To start with, nodes are uniform-randomly distributed throughout 
the network topology; each node moves to a randomly chosen target location at a velocity uniform-
randomly selected from the range [0...vmax] and the node moves to the target location with the chosen 
velocity; after moving to the target location, the node chooses another value for the velocity from the 
range [0... vmax] and moves to a new randomly chosen target location. Each node continues to move like 
this, independent of each other, until the end of the simulation time, which is 1000 seconds. The values 
for vmax used are 3 m/s (low mobility) and 10 m/s (high mobility). For each combination of vmax, number 
of nodes and sink location, we generate mobility profiles for nodes offline and input them to the data 
gathering algorithm under execution. 
 
5.1   Simulation Parameters and their Values 
 
The following are the input parameters for the simulation: 
• TransRange - the fixed transmission range for every sensor node 
• MeanData - the mean value of data generated by every sensor node 
• STDData - the standard deviation of data generated by every sensor node 
• MaxBeaconWindowSize - the maximum size of the beacon window (BW) maintained to store the 
beacons received from each node in the neighborhood 
• MaxTrustScoreBufferSize - the maximum size for the Trust Score Buffer (TSB) maintained at an 
intermediate parent node for every immediate downstream child node. The TSB is used to store the 
raw trust score values (0s and 1s) calculated based on the beacon data received from the neighbor 
child nodes at the beginning of each round. 
• TrustThreshold - the threshold value for the estimated average trust score below which the sensor 
node is classified as CF node. 
• CFProb - the probability with which a non-CF node could become compromised or faulty at any 
round. Once a node becomes a CF node, it continues to remain so till the end of the simulation. 
• MaxCFNodes - the maximum number of nodes that could become CF nodes 
• historyWeight - a weight parameter (ranging from 0 to 1) to capture the tradeoff with respect to giving 
importance to the trust evaluation results collected on a child node at a parent node (in the Trust Score 
Buffer) during their previous associations vs. the trust evaluations during their current association. 
 
The maximum BW size (Beacon Window size) at each sensor node is set to be 10 and 50. The 
maximum size of the Trust Buffer (TSB) maintained by a sensor node for each of the other nodes 
(updated for the child nodes) is set to be 10, 30 and 50. The Check for CF status is conducted for every 
round of data aggregation, once the TSB Size reaches half of its maximum value (set to one of the above 
three values). The value for the TrustThreshold (the minimum value for the estimated average trust score 
below which the node is classified as CF node) is set to values of 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. The historyWeight 
parameter is set to values of 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 1.0: If the historyWeight parameter is set to 1.0, it 
implies that trust score values determined by a parent node for a child node during their current 
association would not be considered and the Check for CF Status will be conducted only based on the 
trust scores estimated during the previous association(s) between the two nodes. On the other hand, a 
historyWeight value of 0.3 implies that relatively much larger importance (100 - 30% = 70% weight) will 
be given to the trust scores determined during the current association between the two nodes. The number 
of CF nodes is set to values of 20 and 40; as the total number of nodes is 100, this corresponds to 
operating the network with 20% and 40% of nodes as CF nodes respectively. Until we have turned on the 
above said number of nodes as CF nodes, any non-CF node in the network has an equal chance of 
becoming a CF node; the probability (CFProb) with which any non-CF node can be come a CF node is 
set to 0.005. Simulations are considered for fixed transmission range per node values of 25 and 35. 
Though the TrustScoreBuffer is filled with the raw trust score data computed on the individual data in the 
BeaconWindow, the parameters MaxTrustBufferSize and MaxBeaconWindowSize are treated 
independently and the values are assigned individually without any dependency on each other. 
Each data point in Figures 2 through 9 is average of results obtained from 100 mobility profiles. For 
each mobility profile, we run the simulation for 1000 seconds. A simulation (corresponding to either the 
MST or LET-based DG trees) is run for fixed values of BW Size (10 and 50), TSB Size (10, 30 and 50), 
TrustThreshold (0.5, 0.7 and 0.9), historyWeight (0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 1.0), transmission range (25m and 
35m), maximum node velocity (vmax = 3 m/s and 10 m/s) and number of CF nodes (20 and 40), resulting 
in a total of 2*3*3*5*2*2*2 = 720 combinations of scenarios for which the results are shown in Figures 2 
through 9. We have also collected results for TrustThreshold values of 0.6 and 0.8 and TSB Size of 70. 
We do not present the results obtained for these combinations of TrustThreshold and TSB Size values due 
to lack of space and the observation of trends similar to those combinations chosen for presentation. 
 
5.2  Data Generation Model 
 
The data measured from the network field is assumed to be the temperature of the field. We want only 
one representative data - either the maximum, minimum or the mean temperature of the network field. In 
the simulations, we assume the data is sensed at each node and broadcast to its neighbor nodes (within the 
transmission range) through beacons. If a node is not a CF node (that is a benevolent regular node, neither 
compromised nor faulty), then the temperature data generated by the node is between the range 
[MeanData - STDData ..... MeanData + STDData]. If a node is a CF node, then the data generated by the 
node is within the range from [0 .... 5*MeanData]. 
For the sake of the simulations, data at a CF-node is generated for sensing by each node according to a 
uniform distribution with mean 80 and standard deviation 20. Accordingly, for every data point, we 
generate a random number from the range x ∈[0 ... 1] and the individual data point generated is then 80 
± 20*x. Data at a CF node is generated uniform-randomly from the range [0... 5*80]. 
 
5.3  Selection of Compromised or Faulty (CF) Nodes 
 
The simulations are conducted with 100 nodes (numNodes). Among these 100 nodes, a fixed number of 
nodes (MaxCFNodes) are set to become CF nodes (Compromised or Faulty) nodes at some time instant 
during the simulation and will continue to remain as CF nodes since then. Any node could become a CF 
node. Until the MaxCFNodes number of nodes have become CF nodes, we run the CFEnable routine at 
the beginning of each round, starting from round # 10 (we wait for at least 10 rounds before setting any 
node to become a CF node). The probability (CFProb) with which a node can become a CF node is an 
input parameter to our simulation. Until the MaxCFNodes number of nodes are compromised or become 
faulty, any node can become a CF node with a probability of CFProb when the CFEnable routine is run.  
The CFEnable routine runs as follows: For every node (node id 0 to numNodes - 1) that is not yet 
compromised or faulty, we generate a random number from 0 to 1. If the random number generated is less 
than or equal to CFProb, then that node is considered to have become a CF node and is added to the list 
of CF nodes. Any number of nodes (0 or more) could become a CF node during a particular round. 
 
5.4  Data Gathering per Round 
 
For each mobility profile, we run the simulation for 1000 seconds. There are 4 rounds of data gathering 
per second, set to be at a fixed rate: the time between two successive rounds of data gathering is 0.25 
seconds. If a DG-tree existed during the previous round, we check whether all the edges in the DG-tree 
exists during the current round. An edge is said to exist if the Euclidean distance between the two 
constituent end nodes of the edge is less than or equal to the transmission range of the nodes. If the DG-
tree exists during a round, then we are ready for data aggregation. We let each sensor node to generate the 
data, whose values depend on whether the node is a CF node or not. A node is assumed to broadcast the 
generated data to its neighborhood; and thereby, a parent node receives a beacon from each of its child 
neighbor nodes (i.e., the immediate downstream nodes). If the DG-tree that existed during the previous 
round(s) no longer exists, then we determine the appropriate DG-tree (using either the MST-based or 
LET-based DG-tree algorithm of [12]) and then initiate data aggregation for the current round. 
 
5.5  Beacon Management 
 
The newly received beacon from a child node (of a unique node ID) is stored in the BeaconWindow  
(BW) maintained for the particular child downstream node. Before inclusion of the new beacon data, if 
BW Size equals the MaxBeaconWindowSize, then the earliest recorded data in the BW is purged and the 
newly received beacon data is appended to the BW. If the BW Size is less than MaxBeaconWindowSize, 
then the newly received beacon is simply appended to the BW. The raw sensed data collected from a 
child neighbor node and accumulated in the BW maintained for the node is used to assess the trust value 
of the child node. 
 
5.6  Performance Metrics 
 
We measure the following for each simulation scenario: (1) The median value for the number of rounds to 
detect the CF nodes (for every CF node correctly identified, we record the difference between the round at 
which the node is identified to be a CF node and the round at which the node was set as a CF node, and 
determine the median value of all these differences), averaged over the 100 mobility profiles. (2) Average 
of the data values collected at the sink node based on the data aggregated from the non-CF nodes and the 
number of non-CF nodes that participated in the data aggregation process.  
 
5.7  Simulation Results and their Interpretation 
 
The MST-based DG-trees have been observed to be more energy-efficient [14]; but more unstable in the 
presence of node mobility [12]. The LET-spanning tree based DG-trees are inherently more stable due to 
the presence of links that are predicted to have a relatively larger lifetime [12].   
For a given simulation condition, in the presence of CF nodes, the LET-based DG-trees have been 
observed to yield more accurate values for the total aggregated data compared to those determined using 
the MST-based DG-trees. We also observe the LET-based DG trees to incur a lower median value for the 
number of rounds to detect the CF nodes (both for 20% and 40% CF node scenarios). For a fixed vmax, % 
CF nodes, transmission range and TSB Size, there is no significant impact of the Beacon Window Size 
(i.e., for BW Size values of 10 or 50) on the median number of rounds to detect the CF nodes as well as 
on the average value for the data aggregated at the sink in the presence of these CF nodes. 
With regards to the impact of the historyWeight parameter, we observe that the SDA Framework incurs 
the lowest value for the median number of rounds (to detect CF nodes) when operated with a 
historyWeight parameter value of 0.3. The effect of the historyWeight parameter is observed more 
prominently when operated under lower TrustThreshold values (especially for 0.5). This is because, when 
we operate at lower TrustThreshold values, it is more likely to take a longer time (# rounds) for the 
estimated average trust score to fall below the smaller TrustThreshold value; hence, it is critical to quickly 
recognize the erroneous data generated at the CF nodes and detect their presence in the network so that 
the aggregated data (if the CF node is an intermediate node) / individual data (if the CF node is a leaf 
node) received from these nodes can be discarded. 
With regards to the impact of the TrustThreshold and TSB Size parameters, for low node mobility 
scenarios, we observe that larger the TrustThreshold, the easier it is to identify and declare a 
compromised or faulty node as CF node. For smaller values of the TrustThreshold parameter, we incur 
more rounds to detect the presence of CF nodes, as more samples need to be collected when the node is 
indeed a CF node, especially for high values of the TSB Size. Note that the Check for CF Status is done 
only when the number of raw trust score values stored in the TSB is at least half of the maximum TSB 
Size. Until then, the presence of CF nodes only corrupts the values for the aggregated data. Hence, it is 
more sensible to operate the network at larger TrustThreshold values and lower TSB Size.  
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Figure 4: Median # Rounds to Detect CF Nodes (vmax = 3 m/s, Beacon Window Size = 10) 
 
For low node mobility scenarios, we observe the median # rounds to detect CF nodes does not depend 
much on the values for the TrustThreshold and gets slightly lower for larger values of TSB Size. As the 
DG-trees are likely to exist for a longer time in low node mobility scenarios, the trust estimates are more 
accurately captured and the CF nodes are more easily identified. There is no need to go through several 
rounds of data gathering and several refreshes to the TSB before identifying the CF nodes. In other words, 
there is no significant impact of the TrustThreshold and the TSB Size on the median number of rounds to 
detect the CF nodes and the detection is done much earlier in low node mobility scenarios vis-a-vis 
compared to the time incurred in case of high node mobility scenarios (see analysis below). As a result, 
there is also less corruption in the data at low node mobility scenarios. 
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Figure 5: Median # Rounds to Detect CF Nodes (vmax = 3 m/s, Beacon Window Size = 50) 
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Figure 6: Median # Rounds to Detect CF Nodes (vmax = 10 m/s, Beacon Window Size = 10) 
 
For larger values of node velocity, the DG-trees are more unstable. As a result, the parent-child 
association between any two nodes does not last for a longer time. Since the trust calculations are 
conducted only after the trust buffer has accumulated a reasonable number of trust estimate values 
(depending the Trust Buffer Size), the median number of rounds to detect the presence of CF nodes 
shoots up to significantly high values in the presence of node mobility, especially for the MST-DG trees 
(could be as large as 6-7 times the values obtained for lower node mobility). The LET-DG trees are more 
stable and hence incur relatively lower values for the median number of rounds to detect the CF nodes. 
The longer it takes to detect the presence of CF nodes, the more the corruption to the aggregated data 
value at the sink.  
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Figure 7: Median # Rounds to Detect CF Nodes (vmax = 10 m/s, Beacon Window Size = 50) 
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Figure 8: Average Aggregated Data Value at the Sink (vmax = 3 m/s, Beacon Window Size = 10) 
For both type of DG-trees, it is imperative that we operate at low Trust Buffer Size in the presence of 
node mobility. Given the negative influence of TSB Size on the median # rounds and data corruption, for 
a given TSB Size, it is more logical to operate the network at larger values of TrustThreshold in high node 
mobility conditions so that the compromised or faulty nodes can be swiftly identified when the estimated 
average trust score falls below the much larger TrustThreshold values. Also, at larger values of the 
Maximum TSB Size, we are more likely to end up with corrupt data because the estimated average trust 
score is begun to be computed only when the TSB Size reaches at least half the maximum buffer size.  
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Figure 9: Average Aggregated Data Value at the Sink (vmax = 3 m/s, Beacon Window Size = 50) 
 
Note that there is no distinction among nodes (whether or not CF nodes) at the time of formation of 
the DG-trees. Only at the time of data aggregation, we take into consideration whether the data 
(individual data in case of leaf node or aggregated data in case of intermediate node) is received from a 
CF node and accordingly a decision to consider or discard the data is taken. At larger values of the 
transmission range (35m), we observe the connectivity of the network to be more likely maintained 
among the nodes (CF node to CF node, CF node to non-CF node, non-CF node to non-CF node) and 
hence we have good chances of maintaining a relatively more accurate Trust Buffer at every parent node 
for each of its immediate downstream child nodes. This translates to an earlier detection of the presence 
of CF nodes, even for larger TSB Sizes (that require a longer wait time to detect the presence of CF 
nodes). On the other hand, with lower transmission range of 25m, operating the network at larger 
TrustThreshold as well as a larger TSB Size, leads to more data corruption. Thus, the median # rounds to 
detect CF nodes is lower for transmission ranges of 35m, compared to that incurred with 25m. In the case 
of 25m transmission range, we observe relatively less network connectivity in the presence of CF nodes 
as well as node mobility. However, note that when energy loss due to transmissions and receptions are 
considered, the larger the transmission range, the larger is the energy loss. Hence, we could cite this as an 
energy-trust tradeoff. 
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Figure 10: Average Aggregated Data Value at the Sink (vmax = 10 m/s, Beacon Window Size = 10) 
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Figure 11: Average Aggregated Data Value at the Sink (vmax = 10 m/s, Beacon Window Size = 50) 
 
The larger the number of CF nodes, we would naturally expect to incur larger value for the median # 
rounds to detect the CF nodes. This is the case observed with TSB Size values of 10 and 30. However, for 
larger values of the TSB Size (50), we observe to sometimes even incur a lower value for the median # 
rounds, especially when operated with 40% of CF nodes (compared to 20% of CF nodes). This could be 
attributed to the observation that with a larger TSB Size, we could effectively detect the presence of a 
bunch of CF nodes in a round of data aggregation as well as discard data from the entire sub tree rooted at 
a CF node (the sub tree could in turn have one or more CF nodes). As a result, for larger TSB Sizes, it is 
possible that the CF nodes are identified as a bunch and data received from them (either in individual or 
aggregated form) is discarded. However, the tradeoff is that until the estimated average trust score 
calculations are begun, the presence of more CF nodes (especially in the case of MST-DG trees at high 
node mobility conditions, as the parent-child node associations are short-lived) could contribute to a 
relatively larger corruption of the data. 
 
5.8  Significant Observations from the Simulation Results 
 
We observe the stability-oriented link expiration time (LET)-driven spanning tree-based data gathering 
trees to be more suitable to assess the trust levels of the nodes and aggregate data using communication 
topology that bypasses (discards data) the compromised or faulty nodes. The median # rounds to detect 
CF nodes (and likewise the corruption in the aggregated data) incurred for the MST-based DG trees is 
much larger than that incurred for the LET-based DG trees, especially in high node mobility scenarios. 
The Beacon Window Size used to assess the trust levels of the nodes is (by itself) not a significant 
parameter to influence the calculations of the estimated average weighted trust score; as long as we have a 
reasonable value for the Beacon Window Size (values of 10 and 50 are used in the simulations), we will 
be able to effectively assess the trust levels of the nodes. In the presence of moderate to high node 
mobility, even operating with a BW of size 10 would be more than sufficient to effectively assess the trust 
level of neighbor nodes. 
The Trust Buffer Size (the buffer that stores the raw trust scores estimated for the nodes at subsequent 
rounds of the current association and previous associations, if any exist, for data gathering) plays a 
significant role. Larger Trust Buffer Size could contribute to collectively detecting one or more CF nodes 
in a single round itself (an intermediate CF node and its sub tree containing one or more CF nodes), 
leading to an overall reduced value for the median # rounds to detect CF nodes; but the data aggregated at 
the sink is also more likely to be corrupted (at least until the TB Size reaches half of its maximum size for 
the Check for CF Status to begin).  
Though operating at a larger transmission range results in more energy consumption and pre-mature 
node failures (in energy-constrained scenarios), we observe larger transmission ranges to be effective to 
maintain the connectivity of the data gathering trees (especially in the presence of a larger percentage of 
CF nodes and high mobility scenarios), leading to lower time to detect CF nodes as well as aggregate 
relatively less corrupted data at the sink.  
Though it is essential to recognize the trust assessment data collected during the previous associations 
of two nodes (a parent node and its child node), relatively more weight  has to be given to the trust data 
collected during the current association in a DG-tree for effective trust assessment.  In our simulations, we 
observe 70% weight to current association and 30% weight to history to be more appropriate. 
The TrustThreshold value (below which a node is classified as CF node) has to be significantly larger 
(0.7-0.9) to quickly detect the CF nodes, especially in highly mobile scenarios. Lower TrustThreshold 
values contribute to much higher values for the median # rounds to detect CF nodes, especially when 
operated with larger TSB Size. Hence, it is more sensible to operate with a larger TrustThreshold value 
and lower TSB Size in dynamically changing communication topologies. 
 
6    Conclusions 
 
The proposed secure data aggregation (SDA) framework will be the first such comprehensive framework 
for defense against both insider attacks (trust evaluation model) and outsider attacks (pair-wise key 
establishment mechanism) for mobile sensor networks. The SDA framework provides the capability for 
WMSNs to develop autonomic and innate defense (self-discovery and assessment) capabilities to detect 
adversarial actions as well as detect and be resistant to network disruption attacks and energy depletion 
attacks (e.g., denial of service, false packet injection attacks). The proposed pair-wise key establishment 
mechanism uses the DA-tree itself as the underlying communication topology to establish pair-wise keys 
and does not require the need for generating a key ring for each node (pre-deployment) and path-based 
key establishment (post-deployment). With node mobility, the DA-trees change with time, and we 
anticipate the SDA framework to establish as many pair-wise secret keys as possible between the sensor 
nodes just based on their association in a DA-tree. Stringent mechanisms are incorporated in the design of 
the pair-wise key establishment mechanism to ensure confidentiality, integrity and authentication of data 
during aggregation. Similarly, the trust evaluation model is designed to swiftly identify the CF nodes and 
bypass the data aggregation process around these nodes. Simulation studies indicate that stability-based 
DA-trees and data gathered as part of the most recent associations between two nodes are to be preferred 
for effectively assessing the trust levels of the sensor nodes. With regards to the various operating 
parameters of the trust evaluation model, we observe the Trust Buffer Size, Trust Threshold and 
transmission range of the sensor nodes to play significant roles (whereas little impact is observed by 
varying the values of the Beacon Window Size). 
 
7    Future Work 
 
As part of future work, we will design the structure of the messages (incorporating all the fields 
envisioned in the design proposed earlier) exchanged as part of the pair-wise key establishment 
mechanism for the SDA framework and implement it in the environment of mobile sensor networks, 
including the energy consumption calculations. We will evaluate the energy consumption overhead 
associated due to the exchanges of messages as part of the pair-wise key establishment mechanism. We 
will also consider the impact of node mobility on the establishment of pair-wise keys between any two 
nodes in the network. While node mobility could increase the number of node pairs between which secret 
keys are newly established, it could also increase the energy consumption overhead due to exchange of 
messages to discover data gathering trees as well as establish/renew secret keys.  
Note that the underlying assumption behind the construction of the DA-tree is that it is constructed in a 
secure fashion and does not comprise of compromised nodes that could launch routing attacks to attract 
traffic (like in warmhole attacks or sinkhole attacks) or generate traffic with multiple identities (like in 
Sybil attacks). The proposed trust evaluation model cannot handle nodes that could launch the above 
routing attacks as the model assumes that the DA-tree is securely constructed without involving nodes 
launching these attacks. We have illustrated the use of our recently proposed protocols to construct DA-
trees in a distributed fashion. Developing a protocol to construct DA-trees that are robust to routing 
attacks (like warmhole, sinkhole or sybil attacks) in mobile sensor networks is beyond the scope of this 
paper. We have not come across any such protocol so far for mobile sensor networks. As part of future 
work, we will develop secure data aggregation protocols that are robust to these routing attacks during the 
process of constructing the DA-tree itself, and evaluate the performance of the trust evaluation model in 
the presence of compromised nodes that launch the routing attacks. 
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